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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND




Foreign-owned multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a cru-
cial role in Mexico's economic development strategy, especially since 1986.
American MNCs, in particular, have been active in many industries, driven
by geographical proximity, access to low-cost labor, and preferential access
to the U.S. market in the context of the North American Free-Trade Agree-
ment (NA ETA). Drawing on a battery of Mexican and international
sources, this paper analyzes recent trends, identifies some concerns, and
examines, in some depth, the Mexican strategy of U.S. MNCs. This paper
also summarizes the recent emergence of Mexican MNCs and their contri-
bution to the restructuring of the global business landscape. The conclud-
ing section draws some policy implications, also on the basis of recent
OECD assessments of the Mexican economy.
1. INTRODUCTIONFOREIGN direct investment (FDI) can be one of the principal driv-
ers of economic and social development. Multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) were crucial players in the past waves of
globalization and their importance has grown further over the past dec-
ade .3 They have provided a massive infusion of capital, technology, and
managerial expertise that, under certain conditions, has played a major
role in the process of economic transformation and growth that many less
developed and newly industrialized countries from around the world have
experienced over the past two decades .4
1 .Presented at the Conference "Challenges and Opportunities in Mexico" hosted by
the Tower Center and the Owens Foundation at Southern Methodist University in
Dallas on March 25-26, 2010.
2. Andrea Goldstein is with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) in Paris. He thanks Enrique Dussel Peters, Taeko Hoshino,
Bdn6dicte Larre, Andy Mold, and Angel Palerm for comments on an earlier ver-
sion. The author remains solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper.
3. Gip-oii~Y JONES, MULT'INATIONAL S AMI) GL OBAL CAPITALISM: fizom 'Iri-n NINE-
'TO TI-ll TwENT-Y-FIRSi CENTURY 20 (2005).
4. See Emerging Multinationals: Who Are They? What do They do? What is at Stake?,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_37467-.36223265_I_1_I
-374ti7,00.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
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MNCs have also played an important role in the political economy of
Mexico in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Making the country at-
tractive for FDI through appropriate macroeconomic and structural poli-
cies-signing free-trade agreements, keeping wage growth in check, and
constraining inflation-has been the centerpiece of Mexico's global inte-
gration strategy and has made the country the poster boy of globalization.
The hope was that EDI would increase the competitiveness of the manu-
facturing sector, which would in turn stimulate growth and industrial re-
structuring in the Mexican economy as a whole. Moreover, through the
transfer of foreign technology and management skills, Mexico hoped
FDI-led growth would improve environmental standards. Closing a vir-
tuous circle, sustainable growth was to remedy the severe poverty that
plagues Mexico by providing jobs and by stemming the flow of poor mi-
grants from rural to urban areas and across the border.
FDI inflows, productivity, and manufactured exports all rose in the
1990s, turning Mexico into one of Latin America's and, indeed, the
world's most successful countries in attracting FDI. The North American
Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) alone led to a sixty percent increase in
FDI inflows. 5 FDI has been associated with higher wages, although there
is no evidence of wage spillovers leading to higher wages for domestic
firms.6 At the state-level, Hanson presents another positive outcome-
exposure to FDI and other features of globalization (import and export
assembly) is positively associated with growth in labor income. 7 The inci-
dence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners whose labor income
would not sustain a family of four at above-poverty consumption levels)
in low-exposure states also increased relative to high-exposure states by
seven percent. 8 There is also positive evidence in the automotive sector:
where multinational exports of vehicles and parts from Mexico grew
from negligible in the 1970s to some $32 billion U.S.D.in 2004, em-
ploying one of every eight workers in the Mexican manufacturing
sector, at pay levels ($1.76 U.S.D. to $11.42 U.S.D. an hour) second
only to the petroleum sector. Foreign-owned assembly and parts
plants in Mexico are rated at the highest quality and efficiency by
independent rating services. 9
5. See Alfredo Cuevas, Miguel Messmacher, & Alejandro Werner, Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Mexico Since the Approval of NA FTA, 19 WoRi-i BANK ECON Rij.v.
473 (2005).
6. See generally Brian Aitken, Ann Harrison, & Robert E. Lipsey, Wages and Foreign
Ownership: A Comparative Study of Mexico, Venezuela and the United States (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5102, 1997), available at http:ll
www.nber.org/papers/w51 02.pdf.
7. Gordon H. Hanson, Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, at 28 (2004), available at http://cpe.ucsd.edu/assets/022/
8788.pdf.
8. Id.
9. TiuEODORE- H. MORAN, PARENTAL SUPRI~SION: Tiim NiEW PARAIGM F ORl FOR-
EJON Dnumcr INVFSTMFNT AND) DEvIiLOPMEN' 11 (2001), available at www.cgdev.
org/dod/books/Moran %2OFDI/Chapter%201.pdf.
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This, however, has not been the only reading. Others have questioned
the contribution of MNCs to recent Mexican development, to the point of
turning FDI into a sort of whipping boy. Gallagher and Zarsky argue
that the large growth of the manufacturing sector has generated import-
dependence and a persistent and growing trade deficit.10 Pacheco-L6pez
reaches similar results." In addition, FDI-led integration with the re-
gional and global economy has done little to promote sustainable indus-
trial development in Mexico.12 Lowe and Kenney argue that Mexico's
consumer electronics industry declined because of the foreign investment
regime, particularly due to the timing of the investment, the geographical
locations of local and foreign manufacturers, and the subsequent depth
and quality of the relationships between firms.' 3 Gallagher and Zarsky
find that many local information technology (IT) firms were put out of
business by foreign investment and that transfer of environmentally-
sound technology was limited.14 Lax environmental standards (the so-
called "pollution haven effect") have been found to be positively corre-
lated with FDI in Mexico, as environmental considerations matter for
firms' investment decisions.15 According to Dussel Peters, foreign firms'
innovative contributions have been very limited and need to be better
targeted.16
Detailed analyses contained in Dussel Peters suggest a middle ground:
"FDI is positively associated with GDP, employment, trade opening, pri-
vate investment, and exports; [and] FDI in Mexico has an enormous posi-
tive potential on these socio-economic variables, [but] it was not possible
to measure the net effects, for instance employment generation, and to
10. Kevin P. Gallagher & Lyuba Zarsky, Sustainable Industrial Development?: The
Performance of Mexico's FDI-led Integration Strategy, Global Dev. and Env't.
Inst., at 4 (2004), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubs/rp/mexicofdireport11-
03.pdf.
11. See Penelope Pacheco-L6pez, Foreign Direct Investment: Exports and Imports in
Mexico, 28:8 WOrum ECON. 1157 (2005), available at http://www3.interscience.wi-
ley.com/journal/118738359/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0.
12. Interestingly enough, during the import substitution industrialization phase (1965-
1984) when FDI was more heavily regulated, multinational firms contributed to a
geographical diffusion of technology and to productivity level convergence with
the United States. See Magnus Blomstrom & Edward N. Wolff, Multinational Cor-
porations and Productivity Convergence in Mexico (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. W3141, 1994), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=238454.
13. See NICIOLA Low, & MARIN KENN7Y, Foreign Investment and the Global Geog-
raphy of Production: Why the Mexican Consumer Electronics Industry Failed, 27:8
WORI D Div. 1427 (1999).
14. KEVIN GALLAGHER & LYUBA ZARSKY, THE ENCdAvE ECONOMY: FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT AND SuSAINAnciE DEVE LOPMENT IN MEXICO's SI ICON VAI u i-y 140
(2007).
15. See generally Andreas Waldkirch & Munisamy Gopinath, Pollution Haven or
Hythe? New Evidence from Mexico, June 7, 2004, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=592721.
16. See Enrique Dussel Peters, Don't Expect Apples From a Pear Tree: Foreign Direct
Investment and Innovation in Mexico, Working Group on Dev. and Env't. in the
Am., at 1 (2009), available at http://www.dusselpeters.com/41.pdf.
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also consider intra- and inter-sectoral [sic] effects."' 7 A recent OECD
report notes that productivity and wages-per-employee are highest in
firms with less than fifty percent FDI (as opposed to zero or more than
fifty percent foreign capital).' 8 And, surprisingly, branches of large man-
ufacturing firms with no FDI show the highest rate of science and tech-
nology expenditure-six percent of GDP.'9
The fast rise of China as a location platform for export-oriented com-
panies, but also as a fast-growing consumption market, has added argu-
ments for the skeptics. Bergin documents that maquiladora industries in
Mexico that are associated with U.S. off-shoring, experience fluctuations
in employment that are twice as volatile as the corresponding industries
in the United States.20 This finding cannot be attributed simply to higher
volatility in the overall Mexican economy, or to the smaller size of Mex-
ico's industries compared to U.S. counterparts. Detailed statistical analy-
sis confirms the high degree of similarity in Chinese and Mexican exports
to the U.S. market and hence the increasing crowding-out of Mexican
exports. 21
This paper examines recent trends of Mexican FDI flows. The next
section presents data on inward flows to place the country's position in
the international investment landscape and to show changes in terms of
industrial composition, country of origin, and region of destination. Sec-
tion three presents additional data on the strategy of U.S. MNCs in Mex-
ico. The recent emergence of Mexican companies as MNCs on their own
is examined in section four, before concluding with some policy
considerations.
II. RECENT PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS
The well-known U.N. Report Multinational Corporations in World De-
velopment highlights that Mexico has traditionally been one of the most
important destinations for FDI, especially among developing econo-
mies.22 In 1967, it held the fourth-largest stock among Development As-
sistance Committee countries, behind Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina.2 3
Brazil and Argentina had higher GDP per capita levels and therefore
17. Id. at 11.
18. Policy Brief, Regional Innovation in 15 Mexican States, at 3 (2009), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/45/1/42644342.pdf.
19. Id.
20. See generally Paul R. Bergin, Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, Volatility
Due to Offshoring: Theory and Evidence (Univ. of Cal. Working Paper, 2009),
available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bergin/research/Offshoringand
Volatility-theory-web.pdf.
21. See CIlNA AND LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMic RELAT-IONS IN THE TWiENTrY-FIRST
CENTURY 375-76 (Rhys Jenkins & Enrique Dussel Peters, eds., 2009), available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?q51=Mali&ots591
=0c54e3b3-le9c-bele-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=111321.
22. See generally U.N. DETv' oF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, Tns IMPACr OF MUI-
TINATIONAL CORPORAIONs ON DiviLOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RnlA-
TIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/6, U.N. Sales No. E.74.II.A.5 (1974).
23. Id. at 184.
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larger internal markets, while Venezuela allowed FDI in the oil industry.
As a result, foreign participation has also been very important in the do-
mestic economy-averaging forty-five percent among middle and large-
sized firms in 1970 and reaching up to 100 percent in sectors such as rub-
ber products and transportation materials.24
In the 1980s, Mexico lost FDI competitiveness, its share in global flows
falling from three percent in 1980-84 (the second largest developing coun-
try destination after Brazil) to 1.4% in 1988-89 (by then surpassed by
China and Singapore, amid a marked contraction in FDI flows to devel-
oping regions). 25 Paradoxically, the importance of FDI in gross domestic
capital formation increased from 4.3% in 1980-82 to 6.6% in 1985-87, in
countertrend to what was happening in the rest of Latin America, from
six percent to five percent. 2 6 These predicaments convinced authorities
to implement "changes to increase the attractiveness of investing in Mex-
ico, including reform of the foreign investment regime." 27 Mexico's entry
into NAFTA in 1995, and in particular chapter eleven of the agreement,
capped the liberalization and bonded Mexico to a number of obligations
pertaining to FDI policy. 2 8
The results were pretty impressive, with the country again becoming
one of the main destinations for private financial flows in developing and
transitional economies-6.5% of FDI in 1993-98.29 In global terms, the
peak was recorded in 2002, when 3.77% of all FDI flows went to Mexico,
before falling to a rather worrisome 1.29% in 2008-equal to 3.54% of all
FDI flows to the developing world and a paltry 15.2% of the FDI flows to
developing America (it was 40.51% in 2002).
While China-its rise as "the factory of the world," but also the erosion
of Mexico's preferential commercial treatment after 1994-is undoubt-
edly the first cause of this slowdown, it is not the only one (Table 1). In
the 1980s, Mexico was attracting 1.5 times as many FDI flows as China,
but in the 1990s, the ratio had already come down to .29, a level that is
grosso modo equivalent to that prevailing in the most recent period. It is
clear that the recent deceleration has other roots when comparing Mex-
24. Id. at 20.
25. U.N. CjwNTRtn ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., WouD INVESTMENT REPORT 1991: TIti
TRIAD IN FOREIGN DIEcT INVESTMENwr at 11, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/118, U.N. Sales
No. E.91.1I.A.12 (1991), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wirl991 over-
view.en.pdf.
26. Id. at 8.
27. NORA LusTIGo, MExIco: TiHE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 126 (1992).
28. Nonetheless, investment barriers, including those for FDI, remain higher than in
most OECD and Latin American countries. See Edward M. Graham & Erika
Wada, Domestic Reform, Trade and Investment Liberalization, Financial Crisis,
and Foreign Direct Investment into Mexico, 23:6 WORLD ECON. 777 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119010846/abstract?CRETRY=1
&SRETRY=0.
29. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND Diy. (UNCTAD), WORLD1t INVESTMENr Rt-
t'otar 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS ANt) AcouisrnoNs AND Devut ot'Mt-NT at
23, U.N. Sales No. E.00.II.D.20 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
wir2000_en.pdf.
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ico with Brazil and Chile. Vis-A-vis the largest Latin American economy,
that attracted three times as many flows in the 1970s, Mexico gained
ground in the 1980s, lost somewhat in the 1990s (when Brazil was in the
middle of a privatization binge), recovered again in the first part of the
current decade, and then lost contact again in recent years. Roughly the
same has happened with Chile, a much smaller country that has attained
global fame for its reformist economic policies: in the 1970s Mexico was
receiving almost eight times as many flows and by 2008 the ratio had
dwindled to 1.3. The real exchange rate explains some of the fluctua-
tions-in particular, flows to non-tradables surged in periods when the
peso appreciated.
TABLE 1: MEXICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LANDSCAPE (1970-2008)30
YEAR 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
MX % world 1.87 2.58 2.12 1.30 3.63 3.77 2.92 3.22 2.25 1.32 1.38 1.29
MX % developing 7.55 11.59 7.20 7.02 13.83 13.48 8.95 8.15 6.66 4.45 5.15 3.54
world
MX % developing 15.87 36.32 20.27 18.33 36.67 40.51 35.98 24.89 28.44 20.70 21.40 15.20
Americas
MX % BR 35.23 138.74 85.75 55.00 132.70 142.99 162.42 130.38 145.50 102.63 78.87 48.71
MX % CN . . 147.55 29.29 44.28 63.57 44.98 30.79 39.02 30.28 26.56 32.66 20.27
MX % CL 757.42 496.33 262.04 370.95 709.60 930.30 382.48 329.85 313.90 264.67 216.88 130.75
The A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index tracks
the country's recent performance in terms of investor attractiveness and
expected profitability.31 Mexico fell from third place in 2003 to twenty-
second place one year later, on account of unsatisfactory progress in
telecom, infrastructure, and energy reforms. From then on it climbed the
rankings again (16th in 2005, 19th in 2007, 8th in 2010) mostly thanks to
greater interest in its natural resources (copper, gold, and silver, in partic-
ular) and the incentives provided by recent bilateral economic agree-
ments such as the Japan-Mexico Economic Prosperity Agreement,
effective in April 2005.32 Other similar sources point in the same direc-
tion. Out of 120 variables used in The Global Competitiveness Report
2009-2010, for example, Mexico is found to have an advantage in twenty
and a disadvantage in 100 (for Brazil the split is 33-to-87, although for
China it is surprisingly not much better at 24-to-96). 33 The factors that
30. UNCTAD Division on Investment and Enterprise, FDI Statistics, http://www.
unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemlD=4979.
31. See 7 A.T. KEARNv, FDI CONFIDENCE INDEX 3 (Oct. 2004), available at http://
www.ogproject.org/library/14.%20ATKearney%20-%20FDI %20Confidence%20
Index.pdf; see also 6 A.T. KEARNEY, FDI CONFIDENCE IN)EX 2 (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.Iib.uwo.ca/files/business/hk-fdiconfidence.pdf.
32. 8 A.T. KEARNEY, FDI CONFIDENCE INDEx 2 (2005), available at http://www.
atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/FDICI_2 005.pdf.
33. Trn- GLOBAL CoMPEI-rrnViNEss RiPOIRr 2009-2010, 222 (Klaus Schwab, ed.,
2009), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.
pdf.
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explain this unsatisfactory performance are well-known-in particular,
poor physical infrastructure and human capital, low productivity, and
slow bureaucracy-and largely derive from domestic policy inefficiencies.
In fairness, an additional factor is non-tariff barriers, in particular border
delays, which reduce the convenience of producing in Mexico for export-
ing to the U.S. market .34
Geographically, there is a high degree of concentration in terms of
both the country of origin (Table 2) and the state of destination (Table 3).
In the ten years since 1999, the Unites States has represented well over
fifty percent of cumulated inward FDI, with Spain and the Netherlands
trailing well behind (15.27% and 10.88%, respectively). Even further are
Canada (3.49%) and the United Kingdom (3.31%). Each year, American
investors have accounted for the bulk of inward FDI. it is important to
underscore that sometimes what appears to be an American investment is
in fact made by a U.S.-based subsidiary of a third-country company. For
tax reasons this has been the case for Japanese companies such as Toyota
and Honda.35
Spanish MNCs were particularly active at the end of the 1990s and
early in the 2000s, when they took part in infrastructure privatization
(Endesa, Telef6nica, Iberdrola) and bought a number of Mexican banks
(Santander-Serfin, BB1VA-Bancomer). According to the Base de Datos
Sistemitica Sobre las Operaciones Internacionales de las Empresas Espa-
fiolas (Icex), Spanish companies concluded 517 operations in Mexico be-
tween 1986 and 2007, their first destination of choice.36
34. See generally Gustavo del Castillo Vera, Non- Tariff Barriers and Waiting Times and
the Northern Mexico Border Crossings, COMFIRClo Ex-rjiiuoi , July 2009.
35. Companies and government officials have complained that this practice distorts
the picture of the Japanese economic contribution to Mexico and therefore makes
it more difficult to negotiate the revision of the Agreement of Mutual Economic
Cooperation. Email from Taeko Hoshino, Deputy Director-General, Institute of
Developing Economies, JETRO, to Andrea Goldstein, OECD (Feb. 8 2010) (on
file with author).
36. Esteban Garcia-Canal, Mauro Giiill~n, Pablo S~inchez- Lorda & Ana Vald~s-
Lianeza, The Expansion of Spanish Businesses into Latin America: An Analysis,
2:2 GiLOBALIZAT ION, COMPI [T1-Vr__N.Ss & GovFRNAnIrrY 32 (2008), available at
http://gcg.universia.net/pdfs-revistas/articulo-91_121682722951 4.pdf.
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TABLE 2. FDI FLOWS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1999-2009)
[MILLIONS OF DOLLARS] 37
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
United States 7,499.8 12,937.6 21,3665 13,003.3 F9,21 1. 1 8,632.2 11,670.7 12,426.4 11,422.9 9,150.9 5,194.7
Japan 1,247.4 442.8 197.2 168.6 128.6 391.2 166.0 -1,424.1 402.9 179.2 93.0
Spain 1,042.2 2,116.5 2,893.5 4,959.9 2,884.9 7,855.5 1,198.3 1,615.3 5,303.2 4,338.2 414.0
The Netherlands 1,086.2 2,697.9 2,652.8 1,607.1 738.2 3,338.5 2,483.6 2,780.5 4,376.2 1,461.3 1,439.1
Germany 774.31 347.8 -108.21 596.3 465.7 408.71 336.61 238.4 539.5 359.4 -212.01
Sweden 690.5 -279.4 -123.8 -38.4 -41.0 188.7 334.1 23.2 24.6 75.3 -4.5
Canada 692.5 670 1,030.7 233.2 303.4 555.2 443.1 539.7 362.3 2522.8 563.4
Denmark 179.0 203.2 250.9 208.41 112.0 115.5 53.8 196.7 89.5 41.7 -4.5
France 168.1 -2,453.4 440.8 355.7 532.0 226.9 363.9 120.8 200.8 112.3 195.7
Switzerland 125.4 147.5 -176.3 461.8 286.9 1156.8 321.3 558.81 602.4 353.81 44.8
Singapore 66.11 80.91 272.7 58.7 -6.0 29.91 12.0 61.1 1 123.6 105.3 49.8
Italy 35.5 36.51 18.0 38.2 9.6 167.7 33.2 20.5 491.1 991.5 11.5
United Kingdom -187.5 282.7 138.1 1,255.3 1,073.7 292.3 1,330.4 1,263.3 576.9 1,050.2 425.4
top 13 - ntal 13,873.4 18,047.1 29,785.4 23,766.5 16,528.2 23,724.3 22,106.4 19,470.3 27,094.5 22,515.9 9,750
top 13-% 96.73 95.48 96.87 96.391 94.98 98.46 84.80 94.61 88.85 88.16 84.21
Total 13419.5 17230.6 28852.9 22908.1 115699.1 23359.1 18,747 18,420.6 24,073.91 19,849.9 18,210.4
37. Secretaria de Economia, Direcci6n General de Inversi6n Extranjera, at 4, available
at http://www.economia.gob.mx/swb/work/models/economia/Resource56/1/I
images/Mat-ElOptf.
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TABLE 3. FDI FLOWS BY STATE OF DESTINATION
(1999-SEPTEMBER 2009) [MILLIONS OF DOLLARs]38
Anlos
Estados 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Aguas- 91.2 81.9 103.7 -14.1 33.6 250.5 101.4 112.9 205.3 33.3 -0.9
calientes
Baja California 1,169.3 984.2 876 978.9 774.7 963.7 1,105.7 931.4 885.1 1,446.3 365.9
Baja California 99.6 80.9 155.1 242.3 118.5 140.5 296.9 293.3 336 130.4 1.8
Sur
Coahuila 233.6 306.9 189.3 204.1 164.6 177.5 147.1 322.8 122.3 1,046.4 73.7
Chiapas 4.3 2.2 -0.5 2.2 1.4 12 1.4 0.6 14.2 0.5 0
Chihuahua 615 1,086.2 765.6 634.8 643.7 694.5 1,484.7 1,495.0 1,517.2 1,121.2 554.1
Distrito 6,298.3 8,983.5 21,951.2 16,536.6 9,976.3 13,864.2 10,720.2 10,016.4 14,314.1 12,085.9 6,644.2
Federal
Durango 24.5 38 40.2 80.2 167.2 35.2 19.4 107.5 38.8 578.4 61.7
Guanajuato 144.3 47.7 274.8 161.9 241.5 59.8 306 -83.5 220.2 156.3 37.3
Guerrero 34.2 11.7 19.3 15.8 54.9 24.9 28 31.4 -50.7 0.6 4
Hidalgo 0.7 -5.6 77.5 4.9 1.7 0.6 -3.7 11.5 2.3 40.3 0
Jalisco 539.5 1,195.9 504 9 273.11 338.5 497 1 1227.7 638.8 438.5 -50 351.9
Estado de 1,409.5 496.3 810.9 735.41 680.1 3,514.7 813.4 1,337.7 760.4 819.7 778
Mkxico
Michoacdn 6.3 29.1 7.7 11.81 -11.7 -1.5 59.8 36 1,593.8 30.9 20.7
Morelos 148 67.4 43.1 94.41 28.2 241.9 -48.2 311 444.4 132.1 -42.7
Nayarit 28.1 44.8 40.2 19.9 90.7 66.9 104.4 151.1 70.9 22.9 -0.9
Nuevo Le6n 1,560.4 2,392.0 2,070.3 2,178.6 1,420.8 1,228.5 4,971.0 1,797.0 3,233.0 1,207.6 328.2
Oaxaca 1.1 -0.5 -1.6 4.5 0.9 3 8.2 10.5 10.3 14.8 0.9
Puebla 204.5 549.1 461.5 480.9 954.9 740.8 -558.1 430 274.8 206 103.5
Queresaro 140.4 179.2 204.8 258 49.7 132.2 70.2 183.5 122.6 137.8 65.4
Quintana Roo 98.9 98.9 126.4 13.1 72.4 80.7 152.8 220.9 348.2 42.4 20.2
San Luis 206.1 290 198.6 10.1 78.4 55.8 127.9 27.3 164.6 77.3 -68.6
Potosi
Sinaloa 41.4 12.1 63 22.9 22.2 54.9 22.2 42.9 54.2 41.4 8
Sonora 224.2 416.21 180 194.8 123.6 266.8 254.1 309.2 563 1,289.9 211.6
Tabasco 52.9 38.91 8.6 75.7 25.2 150.9 34.9 45.1 0.91 35.2 4.7
Tamaulipas 462.1 502.6 360.4 311 336.6 233.3. 379.3 525.1 467.21 359.8 118.4
Tlaxcala 44.8 4.4 13.2 -17.2 28.6 136.5 65.3 9.4 15.5 10.4 -0.9
Veracruz -73.1 24.6 120.8 165.8 44.2 18.2 191.4 40 45.2 26 112.5
Yncatln 41.3 55.5 132.9 13.8 30.9 21 4.1 26.4 46.7 22.6 -8.4
Zacatecas 11.1 12.5 5.5 4.8 0.1 5.1 3.7 15.4 794.8 1,490.3 3.7
Total 13,773.3 17,944.7 29,699.7 23,713.1 16,458.8 23,419.6 21,989.8 19,283.7 26,848.5 22,500 9,748.9
In terms of interstate localization, one single unit, the Federal District,
has attracted almost sixty percent of the total (58.3%). The four next
units-namely Nuevo Le6n (9.93%), Estado de M6xico (5.39%), Chihua-
hua (4.71 %), and B aj a California (4.65 %)-account for almost twenty-five
percent. Among the other states, only Jalisco in the earlier period, as well
as Sonora and Zacatecas in 2008, ever made the Top Five listing. It must
be highlighted that this is not activity data and that this results in an over-
38. Id. at 5.
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estimate of the weight of the state where corporate headquarters are lo-
cated, i.e. the Federal District.
Against the background of the rise in FDI since the 1990s, it is hardly
surprising that MNCs have gained ground in the ranking of Mexico's larg-
est companies-from twelve percent to thirty percent of the total sales of
the top 500 companies between 1992 and 2002.39 By 2008, there were
thirty-eight foreign-owned companies in the top 100 ranking, accounting
for over one-third of sales (Table 4). U.S. MNCs dominated the listing,
followed by Spanish and German ones (with these European-owned com-
panies being on average much larger than their U.S. peers).
TABLE 4. THE LARGEST FIRMS IN MEXICO IN 200840
Ownership Number of firms Total sales Percentage of sales Average sales per company
Mexican 62 3,903,053 64.65 62,952
Private 56 2,497,824 41.37 44,604
State 6 1,405,229 23.27 234,205
Foreign 38 2,134,464 35.35 56,170
us 21 1,182,345 19.58 56,302
ES 6 522,484 8.65 87,081
DE 3 210,522 3.49 70,174
UK 2 78,406 1.30 39,203
CA 2 43,986 0.73 21,993
NL 2 38,071 0.63 19,036
CH 1 30,249 0.50 30,249
AR 1 28,400 0.47 28,400
TOTAL 100 6,037,517.10 100 60,375
Note: The ranking includes both holding companies and operating
companies and therefore the classification is only illustrative. Inward
FDI flows have concentrated in export-oriented manufacturing (43.54%)
and non-tradable financial services (25.22%).41 In manufacturing, the
machinery and equipment sub-sector has attracted 19.25% of the ten-
year total, although the peak was registered in 1999-2000. A comparison
of flows in the 1999-2003 and 2004-08 sub-periods shows the decreasing
importance of labor-intensive sub-sectors such as textiles, clothing and
footwear (that had received a boost from the 1994 devaluation of the
peso) and wood and furniture. 42  Nonetheless, maquiladoras transna-
39. MARfA DE~ LOS ANGELE~S POZAS, ESTRUCt-URA Y DINAMICA DE L A GRAN EM-
1RESA EN MI~XICO: CINCO Es-ruiu-ios S013RE su REALIDAD RECIEN-rF- 81 (2006).
40. The ranking includes both holding companies and operating companies and
therefore the classification is only illustrative. See Expansion 500: Las Empresas
Mas Importantes de Mexico (2009), http://www.cnnexpansion.com/XPA5002009/?
uid=11 (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
41. See Table 5.
42. According to the most recent International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation
Costs in Manufacturing by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, covering 2007, in Mex-
ico a production worker earns twelve percent of a US equivalent, but three times
as much as in the Philippines and six times as much as in Sri Lanka. China is not
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tional companies have remained in Mexico despite a higher cost structure
"because it allows them to meet the needs of demanding North American
customers that are willing to pay a higher price for non-standardized
products."14 3  In banking, foreign participation in the Mexican system
went from roughly six percent in 1995 (compared to ten percent in Brazil,
slightly less than twenty percent in Argentina, and thirty percent in Chile)
to almost seventy-five percent in 2002, way above the levels recorded in
these other countries.44
TABLE 5. FDI FLOWS BY SECTOR (1999-2009)
[MILLIONS OF DOLLARS]45
Sectors Years
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 12005 2006 2007 12008 2009
Agriculture 82.6 91.6 63t.8 93 11.8 21.91 10.2 22.1 132.4 32.5 7.3
etc.I
Mining & 246 170.2 12 260.5 139 210 223.8 393.4 1,762.501 4,296.80 236.7
petroleum
Manufacturing 9,177.10 9,990.20 5,897.00 8,796.70 7,75270 13,232.80 11,123.90 9,953.50 12,027.20 6,941.30 3,796.30
industries IIII II
Food etc. 1,118.20 1,495.90 288.9 2,312.501 2,095.90 3,779.80 2,458.50 1,892.401 1,301.10 1,387.00 744
Textiles, cloth- 414.4 398.3 225.8 357.8 233.8 226.3 246.4 3271 44.5 178.6 45.8
ing and foot-
wear
Wood and fur- 19.9 46.2 38.5 25 30.2 11.8 22.9 17.81 26.7 12.9 4.9
niture
Paper 1 97.8 249.8 172.9 422.2 224.7 305.2 114.6 43.2 200.31 195.2 53.5
Chemicals 986.4 1,49620 592.6 1,557.91 813.9 1,956.10 776.5 2,414.50 1,980.401 1,484.10 296.2
N on-metahec 248.7 154.8 100.2 -64.4 78.6 1,378.00 112.3 183.1 -10.5 84.3 29.8
mineralsI
Basic metals 259.8 257.8 465 314.4 36.91 127.4 2,752.51 286.1 3,721.001 192.9 -23.7
Machinery & 5,457.20 4,578.20 3,463.80 3,363.40 3,847.61 5,197.50 4,066.40 4,150.60 4,335.01 2,927.81 2,236.10
equipment
Other mans- 574.7 1,313.10 540.4 507.8 391.1 504.71 573.7 638.8 447.81 478.5 409.6
facturing
industries
Electricity and 150.3 134 333.4 446.71 325.5 202.4 201.5 -87 166.3 414.1 5.6
water
Construction 109.6 171.1 112.3 359.8 84.7 389 298 389.6 1,874.10 804.3 185.2
Commerce 1,439.60 2,464.501 2,351.20 1,798.30 1,509.81 1,274.00 2,837.40 565.2 1,449.30 1,613.10 1,582.30
Transports & 295.5 -1,932.60 2,925.80 3,949.90 2,198.30 1,657.50 2,869.50 637.1 825.3 809.7 121.2
communica-
tions
Financial ser- 776.3 4,860.20 16,459.30 6,755.80 2,904.90 5,730.90 1,642.20 4,753.20 6,746.30 4,295.50 2,231.70
vicesI
Other services 1,596.50 2,098.20 1,630.40 1,306.101 1,601.60 1,006.10 2,900.00 2,843.40 2,111.50 3,309.10 11583.70
Total 13,873.50 18,047.40,29,785.20 2,6.01583023,724.60122,106.50 19,470.50+27,094.90122,516.4019,750.00
included in the study. See Press Release, International Comparisons of Hourly
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2007, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
ichcc.nr0.htm (last visited Jan. 28 2010).
43. John Sargent & Linda Matthews, What Happens When Relative Costs Increase in
Export Processing Zones? Technology, Regional Production Networks, and Mex-
ico's Maquiladores, 32 Woi3~ Dr-v. 2015 (2004).
44. ALEJANDRO MICCO & UcGo PANIL/,A, UNL~OCKING CRE~oi-: Till., QUE~ST FOR
DEEIP ANDs STABILE BANK LENDING 131 (fig.10.4) (2005).
45. Secretaria de Economina, supra note 37, at 2.
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Finally, liberalization and the global consolidation of particular indus-
tries have driven the big jump in cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) activity over the past fifteen years. In 1998, the number of newly
acquired affiliates of U.S. MNCs (276) around the world had already sur-
passed that of established affiliates (201).46 M&A activity in Mexico ac-
celerated in 2005-07, before experiencing a marked decline in both value
and volume of deals during 2008-09 due to the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis (Table 6). Foreign buyers have accounted for a growing
share of completed deals' volume (from 51.4 % in 2005 to 70.3 % in 2008)
and value (from 66.3% in 2005 to 71.9% in 2008). Each year, bar 2006,
the average deal size has been larger for foreign than for Mexican buyers
(Table 6). Over the twenty-four transactions over $300 million U.S.D.
concluded in 2006-08, the foreign-domestic split is 50:50; but foreign bid-
ders were responsible for seven out of eight mega-deals (worth more than
$1 billion U.S.D.). 4 7
TABLE 6. ANNOUNCED TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
MEXICAN TARGETS
[MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS]48
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total deal value 6,518 8,328 10,135 7,798
Deal value: Mexican acquirer 2,198 4,124 3,296 2,188
Deal value: foreign acquirer 4,320 4,204 6,839 5,610
Total deal volume 35 50 44 37
Deal volume: Mexican acquirer 17 21 19 11
Deal volume: foreign acquirer 18 29 25 26
Average deal size 186 167 230 211
Average deal size: Mexican buyers 129 196 173 199
Average deal size: foreign buyers 240 145 274 216
Share of volume: foreign buyers 51.4% 58.0% 56.8% 70.3%
Share of value: foreign buyers 66.3% 50.5% 67.5% 71.9%
Mexican M&A activity started with a bang in 2010, when Heineken
acquired FEMSA Cerveza for $7.3 billion U.S.D. in return for a twenty
percent stake in the Dutch brewer.49 The deal was important not only
because it signaled that investing in emerging markets is seen positively
again by financial markets, but also insofar as it sparked a controversy in
46. Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations in 1998, 80
SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 26, 33 (2000).
47. The largest deals of the period were Criteria Caixa's purchase of a twenty percent
stake in Grupo Financiero Inbursa for approximately US$2.1 billion and the take-
over of Grupo tMSA by Ternium (an Argentinean-Italian company incorporated
in Luxembourg) for US$1.85 billion. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, M&A Insights:
Mexico, at 8 (2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/es-.MX/mx/publicaciones/
arch ivo/m a-in sigh ts 09.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Julio Serrano, La Extranjerizacion de la Industria Cervecera Mexicana, MILFENIO
ONL INE, Jan. 13, 2010, http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8702391.
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Mexico concerning the denationalization of the economy.50 Some feared
the consequences of transferring from Monterrey to Amsterdam the
center of corporate decisions of a firm that is not only emblematic but
also directly or indirectly employs thousands of Mexicans. 5' Others, on
the other hand, saw opportunities opening up for the global distribution
of iconic Mexican brands, such as Dos Equis, Tecate, and Sol.52 Time will
say where, between two extreme views, reality will place itself.
111. THE CASE OF U.S. INVESTORS
U.S. MNCs have traditionally considered Mexico as one of their pre-
mier markets for international expansion. Initially limited also exclu-
sively to natural resources (the Guggenheim brothers built two smelters
in the late 19th century, Standard had more than $32 million U.S.D. in-
vested in exploration and production by 1922), this drive later extended
to consumer goods (Coca-Cola in 1927, for instance), durable goods
(Ford Motors in 1925, General Motors in 1937), and also supporting ser-
vices such as advertisement. 53 Founded in 1917, the American Chamber
of Commerce of Mexico is the oldest and largest of its kind around the
world.
In the mid-1960s, sales of United States enterprises were estimated to
represent seventeen percent of the gross value of industrial production. 54
The gross product of majority-owned Mexican affiliates of U.S. MNCs as
a percentage of GDP rose from 2.4% in 1989 to 3.4% 1998.55 The U.S.
direct investment position in Mexico grew by a factor of nineteen in 1982-
2008, well above the growth rate recorded for all foreign countries, but
still (and as expected, also on account of the low level in 1982) much
more slowly than for China (Table 7). By 2008, Mexico was the eleventh
largest destination of U.S. FDI, and the largest developing economy. 56
50. Id.; Carlos Mota Femsa, Heineken y nuestros prejuicios, MILAHN1o ONI INr-, Jan. 13,
2010, http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8702316.
51. Serrano, supra note 49.
52. Mota, supra note 50.
53. Julio E. Moreno, J. Walter Thompson, the Good Neighbor Policy, and Lessons in
Mexican Business Culture, 1 920-1 950, 5:2 ENTERPRISE Soc. 254 (2004).
54. Tmi IMPACr OF MULTrINAIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVF LOPMFNT ANI), ON IN-
TERNATIONA!- Rn ATIONS, supra note 22.
55. U.S . Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, July 2000 and pre-
vinus issues, http://www.bea.gov/sch/date-..guide asp.
56. Not considering the United Kingdom Islands in the Caribbean (4.4%). U.S. Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, July 2009, http://www.bea.
gov/scb/toc/0709cont.htm.
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TABLE 7. U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD ON
A HISTORICAL-COST BASIS, 1982-200857
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2008
Mexico 5,019 5,434 13,730 24,050 56,303 95,618
Argentina 2,864 2,818 3,327 10,980 11,288 15,195
Brazil 9,290 11,128 16,313 35,778 27,598 45,500
Chile 311 617 2,544 9,148 8,928 12,613
South America 19,243 21,372 28,124 68,327 63,226 108,231
Latin America 28,161 50,147 191,307 180,818 289,413 563,8091
China 49 240 563 5,150 10,570 45,695
India 360 407 484 1,563 4,232 16,104
Indonesia 2,295 3,252 4,384 6,729 (D) 17,909
Malaysia 1,221 962 1,596 6,530 7,101 13,291
Singapore 1,720 2,722 6,715 18,026 50,955 106,529
Thailand 780 1,349 2,594 4,332 7,774 9,128
All Countries 207,752 326,253 502,063 871,316 1,616,548 3,162,021
In terms of sectoral composition, there has been a marked shift from
manufacturing to services and mining. 58 In particular, while only 0.19%
of the U.S. stock of mining FDI in 1999 was held in Mexico, the percent-
age has grown to 3.2% over the decade (Table 8). On the other hand,
Mexico has seen its share of U.S. manufacturing FDI fall from 5.93% in
1999 to 4.26%in 2008 (Table 8). Although data issues make it impossible
to further dissect these trends, it is clear that U.S. MNCs in the food and
beverages industry have redirected their investment flows away from
Mexico. Mexico has obviously lost ground to China in this period as far
as U.S. FDI is concerned, especially in manufacturing. Interestingly,
transport equipment is an industry where Mexico appears to have held its
own. In 2003, the initial quality level of vehicles produced at plants in
Mexico and exported to the United States had already surpassed that of
vehicles manufactured at U.S. plants, according to the J.D. Power and
Associates 2003 Initial Quality Study.59 Aerospace is also developing rel-
atively fast, while Boeing, General Electric, Goodrich, and Bombardier
Aerospace are lured by location and talent to set up supply shops in Qu6-
retaro and elsewhere. 60
57. Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts, http:II
www.bea.gov/international/dil usdbal.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
58. See Table 8.
59. i.D. Power and Associates Reports: Mexico Automotive Plants Outperform U.S.
Assembly Plants in Initial Vehicle Quality, BUS.WIRI3, May 8, 2003, http://findarti-
cles.com/p/articles/mi -m0EIN/is -2003..May.8/ai- 101 429682/? tag=con ten t;col 1.
60. See e.g., Mexico Bets on Aerospace, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2007; Smooth Take-off
for a Growing Industry, FIN. TimirS, Nov. 18, 2008. Safran of France is the largest
firm in this industry in Mexico, employing 3,000 people (out of 55,000 worldwide)
in eight factories. Les Productions Sophistiquges Doivent Rester Sur le Sol Na-
tional, Lii MONDF, Mar. 17, 2010.
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TABLE 8. U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION BY SECTOR,
1999 AND 2008 [MILLIONS OF DOLLARS]61
Mexico/
Mexico China World Wo~rld Mexico/China
________________1999___ 2i~7 008 1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008
All industries 34,265 9,618 7,766 45,695 1,132,622 3,162,021 3.03 3.02 441.22 209.25
Mining 188f4,865 91 3,014 99,925 151,859 0.191 3.20 18.971 161.41
Manufacturing 18,~861 2,81 4,789 21,428 318,121 512,293, 5.93 426, 393.841 101.83
Of whiich,
Food 5,257 2,4821 150 730 36.126 41,802 14.55 5.94 3504.67 340.00
Chemicals 3.037 4,3001 259 4,614 82,794 108,049 3.67 3.99 1172.59 93.32
Primary and fabricated metals 511 (D)04 203 609 18,803 24,038 2.72 .. 251.72
Machinery (D) (D) 946 1,534 37,833 36,807
Computers and electronic products ... (D) .... 8,142 ... 76,453
Electrical equipment, appliances, and (D) 1,221 2,343 701 38,449 24,095 .5.07 .. 174.18
components
Transportation equipment 4,278 5,0301 123 2,146, 36,013 51,774 11.88 9.72 3478.05 234.39
Other manufacturing 4,198 9,209 765 2,951 68,103 149,275 6.161 6.171 548.76 312.06
Wholesale trade 1,167 2,361 201 3,219 80148 178,213 1.461 1.321 580.60 73.35
Information . . 2,758 . . 223 . . 121,864 . 2.26 . . 1236.77
Depository institutions 1,182. (D) 69 (D) 39,937 141,557 2.961 . .11713.04
Finance (except depository institutions)), 6,308 15,736 784 1,895 436,024 634,046 1.45 2.481 804.591 830.40
real estate, and insurance
Professional, scientific, and technical ser- 1,303 460 260 773 68,763 81,242 1.89 0.57 501.15 i59.51
vices
Holding companies (nonbank) (D) 16,865 .. 1,556 . 1,128,538 .. 1.491 . 1083.87
IOther industries 5,257 (D) 6731 (D) 89,7051 212,409j 5.861 . -1 781.131
Data on the operations of U.S. manufacturing MNCs in Mexico since
1998 further confirm some of the main trends described elsewhere. 63
Turnover had more than doubled over the period, but the incidence of
Mexico in the global sales of U.S. manufacturing MNCs has increased
only slightly compared to the much faster growth experienced in China
and other emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere.64 A stark contrast
also emerges between the importance of Mexico in terms of employment
(twelve percent in 2006), and research and development expenditures
(probably lower than one percent by 2006), which, when combined with
the decline in terms of value added, highlights the country's difficulty in
surfing on the innovation of off-shoring waves. An additional cause of
concern is that, notwithstanding geographical proximity, NAFTA and
other preferential trade agreements, Mexico's share in the global exports
of US manufacturing MNCs has collapsed from 23.3% in 2002 to 16.1%
four years later.65
61. E.g., Sylvia E. Bargas, Direct Investment Positions for 1999: Countfry and Industfry
Detail, 80 SURVEY OF CURREN-r Bus. 58 (2000); Marilyn Ibarra & Jennifer Koncz,
Direct Invesfment Posit ions for 2008: Countfry and Industry Detail, 89 Suizvi'v. oi,
CURRENr Bus. 20 (2009).
62. (D) means suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
63. See Table 9.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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TABLE 9. OPERATIONS OF U.S. MANUFACTURING MNCS IN
MEXICO, 1998-2006 [BILLIONS $U.S.1 66
Mexico as a percentage of all
Mexico countries
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1998 12000 12002 2004 2006
Turnover 60.8 67 73.9 81.5 76.8 132.0- 3Y7 6.3 6.9 5.0 4.0-
Number of employees 530.4 641.9 619.8 526.1 545.0 13.3 14.6 14.4 12.2 12.0
Value added 11.4 15.1 16.2 14.7 16.9 4.6 4.8 5.2 3.8 3.7
R&D expenditure 191' 231 181t (D) 1 .3 b 1.3 1.0 .. (D)
Exports from Mexico 260  39.0 40.6 39.7 45.3 14.6 b 21.3 24.3 21.7 16.1
Exports as a share of turnover 42.9 52.8 49.8 51.7 34.3
Imports into Mexico 23.8b 29.6 27.5 25.2 36.5 11.3 ' 21.1 23.3 20.1 116.1
Net trade balance 2 .3 ' 8.4 13.1 13.5 8.81
Intra-firm exports .. 26.1 24.2 20.2 . .22.1 24.6 19.7
Intra-firm imports .. 36.2 36.6 36.0 . .22.8 25.3 22.9
Gross operating surplus 2.2 2.9 2.5 12.3 .. 4.30 4.45 4.90 3.21
The listing of the ten largest U.S. companies in Mexico (including
Mabe, which sf ricf u sensu is not a foreign-owned company although GE is
the largest shareholder confirms the relevance of the transport equipment
industry.68 The Detroit "Big Three," in particular, are among the four
largest American firms in Mexico and also the biggest car-makers. The
reasons are relatively easy to identify: relatively low wages, geographic
proximity and preferential access to the North American automotive
market, and potential domestic demand prospects. While large invest-
ments by already-present German manufacturers and by new Asian man-
ufacturers means that the Big Three's share in total Mexican car
production has decreased from 57.3% in 2000 to 50% in 2008, Mexico
now accounts for one percentage more of the total global production of
U.S. auto-makers. 69
66. E.g., Mataloni, supra note 46, at 26-47; Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S.
Multinational Companies: Operations in 2006, 88 SUR~VEY OF~ CuRRIUN'r Bus. 26
(2008); Measuring Globalisation: Activities of Multinationals, Volume I.-
Manufacturing, 2000-04, OECD (2008).
67. (a) refers to sales of goods; (b) refers to all US MNCs.
68. See Federico lBonaglia et al., Accelerated Internationalization by Emerging Mul-
tinationals: The Case of White Goods, 42(4) J. OF~ WORLD) Bus. 369 (2007).
69. See Table 11.
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TABLE 10. THE LARGEST US MNCS IN MEXICO 70
Exports
RK Sales Sales Change Profits EBITDA Payroll % sales
RK MIX Name Company Sector 20085 2007 (2007/08) 7008 2008 2008 2008
1 6 WAL-MART Retail 17,705.9 20,610.3 -14.1 1,060.8 1,726.9 170,014
2 9 GENERAL MOTORS Antomotive 12,027.0 11,216.1 7.2 N.D. N.D. 12,669
3 12 CHRYSLER Automotive 9,120.0 9,753.3 -6.5 N.D. N.D. 11,180 63.2
4 21 FORD Antomnotive 5,885.4 7,303.0 -19.4 1N.D. N.D. 5,300
5 23 HEWLETT- Electronics 5,704.8 5,052.1 12.9 N.D. N.D. 5,750
PACKARD
6 33 MABE Electronics 3,950.0 3,858.5 2.4 N.D. N.D. 22,350 74.1
7 41 GRUPO PEPSICO Beverages 3,300.0 3,498.0 -5.7 N.D. N.D.
8 44 DELPHI Automotive 3,093.5 5,236.4 -40.9 N.D. N.D. 61,000
9 47 SANMINA-SCI Electronics 3,030.0 2,900.8 4.5 N.D. N.D. 15.000
10 56 GENERAL Electronics 2,569.0 2,388.0 7.6 N.D. N.D. 11,686
ELECTRIC
TABLE 11. MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF U.S.
AUTO-MAKERS, 2000-200871
2000 (units) 2003 (units) 2008 (units) 2000 () 2003 (7/) 2008(%
GENERAL MOTORS
United States 4,223,012 3,996,629 2,356,576 . .
Mexico 443,368 471,619 509,033 5.45 5.81 6.15
All Countries 8,133,375 8,112,039 8,282,803 . .
FORD
United States 3,799,857 3,201,946 1,602,011 . .
Mexico 264,436 144,647 307,034 3.61 2.22 5.68
All Countries 7,322,951 6,526,171 5,407,000 .
CHRYSLER
United States 1,792,379 1,725,779 1,106,028 9
Mexico 401,193 308,530 279,787 13.51 12.24 14.78
All Countries 2,970,415 2,520,513 1,893,068 .
Mexico All manufacturers 1,935,527 1,575,447 2,191,230 . .
All US in Mexico 1,108,997 924,796 1,095,854 .
US in all MX . . 57.30 58.70 50.01
MX in all US . . 6.02 5.39 7.03
In 2008 the Big Three were already producing fewer cars in Mexico
than in 2000 (although more than in 2003). The economic crisis is further
affecting the automobile industry in Mexico-slightly over 1.5 million ve-
hicles were produced in 2009, a 28.3% contraction that was equally attrib-
70. 500 Maiores Empresas da America Latina, AMERICA ECONOMIA, July 2009.
71. Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automnohiles (OICA), QICA
Correspondents Survey (World Motor Vehicle Production); see OICA-Production
Statistics 2009, http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/ (last visited Aug. 18,
2010).
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utable to the slowdown in the domestic and export markets.72 Some
U.S.-owned companies have introduced technical stoppages while others
are carrying out deep restructuring. Ford, for example, inaugurated a
new $838 million plant in Chihuahua in November 2009 to produce truck
diesel engines for exports to the United States and the United King-
dom.73 Other investments are being planned in Cuautitlin, Estado de
M6xico, to produce the Fiesta model and in Guanajuato to manufacture
transmissions. Following the takeover by Fiat, Chrysler announced plans
to build the Cinquecento at the Toluca assembly plant where the PT
Cruiser is currently produced. 74 Total annual volume will exceed 100,000
vehicles divided between North America and Latin America.75 GM
Mexico, on the other hand, slashed jobs as it reeled from a sharp decline
in U.S. and Mexican demand.7 6
Returning to Table 10 above, Wal-Mart de M6xico (WALMEX) is not
only the largest U.S. owned company in Mexico (and in fact also the
country's largest private employer) but is also the Mexican subsidiary of a
U.S. MNC that occupies the most important position in the mother-com-
pany global strategy. In 2008, WALMEX sales were equal to 4.44% of
Wal-Mart's worldwide sales.77 It operated 1,197 stores in Mexico (out of
7,873 worldwide)78 and employed more than 168,000 people (2.1 million
worldwide).
In 1991, Wal-Mart's joint venture with Cifra, the leading chain of self-
service stores, and the opening of a Sam's Club in Mexico City marked
the birth of Wal-Mart's International division. According to Javorcik, the
most fundamental motivation was Mexico's NAFTA and GATT member-
ship.79 In 1997, Wal-Mart acquired a majority position in Cifra, and in
February 2000 the name changed to WALMEX. In November 2006,
WALMEX received a license from Mexico's Finance Ministry to organize
and operate a bank in the country.80 In November 2007, Wal-Mart bank
began operations with sixteen branches in five states of Mexico.8 1
72. Asociacion Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz (AAAIA), July 2010 Bulletin,
http://www.amia.com.mx/bdeautos.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
73. Ford Opens Second Chihuahua Engine Plant, C11no1UAHUAN FRONTIR, Nov. 17,
2009, http://www.chihuahuanfrontier.com/companies/businessnews/108-fordplant.
html.
74. See Chrysler to Make Fiat in Mexico, WALL S'r. J., Aug. 17, 2009.
75. Abarth Variant Will Roll Out Beside Fiat 500, WardsAuto.com, Dec. 17, 2009, http:/
/subscribers.wardsauto.com/ar/abarthvariant fiat_091217/wall.htmlreturn=http://
subscribers.wardsauto.com/ar/abarth variant-fiat091217/.
76. Geely, China's largest auto-maker, showed interest in building a factory in Mexico
in 2008. In March 2009, on account of the crisis, it pulled back and concentrated
on attempts to take over Volvo or Saab.
77. WALMEX sales were US$17,828.7 at the average exchange rate of 11.11937301.
78. As of November 30, 2009, total units had risen to 1,391.
79. Beata Javorcik et al., Openness & Indus. Response in a Wal-Mart World: A Case
Study of Mex. Soaps, Detergents & Sufactant Producers, WORoI. ECON., 1558
(2008), available at http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/beata.javorcik/
JavorciketalWE.pdf.
80. Wal-Mart Corporate: International: Mexico, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/
277.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
81. Id.
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Size, omnipresence, and visibility often make Wal-Mart the scourge of
anti-globalization pundits and WALMEX is obviously not immune from
these concerns.82 In a careful examination of this case, Tilly observes that
by introducing several innovations perfected in the United States (in pric-
ing and management of inventory, labor, and suppliers), WALMEX has
spurred the rapid modernization of a portion of the Mexican retail sec-
tor.8 3 Javorcik similarly finds that WALMEX forced suppliers to cut their
profit margins and/or innovate and that, partly in response to its pres-
ence, many Mexican producers of soaps, detergents, and surfactants
logged impressive efficiency gains.84 In addition, WALMEX pays wages
slightly above the Mexican retail industry average, offers pay and benefits
comparable to its competitors (though with some notable differences),
and is relatively open to union representation.
In sum, if there are reasons to fear that Wal-Mart's explosive growth in
Mexico may have negative implications, in particular in the governance of
the supply chain for horticulture products, those reasons appear to apply
with equal force to the rest of the retail sector. Applying a dynamic in-
dustry model in which firms decide whether to sell their products through
WALMEX or use traditional retailers, lacovone's "model predicts that
the associated market share reallocations, adjustments in innovative ef-
fort, and exit patterns increase productivity and the rate of innovation."185
Interestingly, although Mexican detergent exports captured an increasing
share of the U.S. detergent market over the past decade, Mexican sales in
the U.S. were inhibited by a combination of excessive shipping delays at
the border and artificially high input prices (due to Mexican protection of
domestic caustic soda suppliers).
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN MULTINATIONALS
While the focus of this paper so far has been on the presence of foreign
companies in the Mexican economy, the past decade has also witnessed
the fast rise of a new phenomenon in the international investment land-
scape, i.e. the gromwth of MNCs based in emerging economies. Corporate
Mexico has fully participated in these dynamics. According to Hoshino,
eleven of the twenty largest business groups have large-scale overseas di-
rect investment.86 In 2007-08, Mexican buyers made twenty-seven out-
bound acquisitions worth $20.6 billion U.S.D. In 2007 the total deal value
was driven by Cemex's purchase of Australia's Rinker for $15.5 billion
U.S.D., while Bimbo's $2.5 billion U.S.D. acquisition of US bakery busi-
82. See Simon Head, Inside the Leviathan, N.Y. Rijv. OF- BOOKS, Dec. 16, 2004, http:I/
www. nybook s.com/a rt iclecs/arch ives/2004/dec/1 6/i nside-th e- leviathan -2/.
83. Chris Tilly, Wal-Mart & Its Workers: NOT the Same All Over the World, 39 CONN.
L. Rvv. 1805 (2007).
84. Javorcik, supra note 79, at 1577.
85. Leonardo lacovone et al., Walmart in Mexico: The Impact of FDI on Innovation &
Indus. Productivity (Jan. 2009), at 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Univ. of Colo.), available at http://spot.colorado.edu/-kellerw/IJKT-012609.pdf.
86. See Table 1.
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ness Weston Foods boosted overall deal value in 2008.87
The geographical reach of Mexican MNCs is ample. While some began
in the North, to cater to the large Mexican diaspora there, others (in par-
ticular in construction) first invested in Central America, where market
conditions were less demanding. In recent years South America has at-
tracted a lot of attention. In Argentina, for instance, Mexican FDI sur-
passed $300 million U.S.D. in 2007, in sectors as diverse as
petrochemicals, appliances, car parts, media and communication, banks,
and tourism. Even Buenos Aires' first Starbucks is Mexican! 88
The two iconic Mexican MNCs are very different. Cemex is one of the
world's three largest cement producers, where it vies for global leadership
with two European companies (Fuentes-Berain 2007). Based in Monter-
rey and almost solely active in this business, "Cemex is a prototypical
'global consolidator', expanding by acquisition and competing on opera-
tional excellence in a mature industry in both emerging and developed
economies." 89 The initial drive for its overseas expansion was the threat
posed by the entry of a European rival in the domestic market, which led
first to forays into the rest of Latin America and then to an investment in
Spain to challenge its French and Swiss competitors in their natural mar-
ket. Cemex later built size across emerging markets, mainly thanks to
prowess in logistics and information technology, and eventually made two
big-ticket acquisitions in the U.K. and Australia to further diversify away
from its home market.
America M6vil, in turn, operates regionally in telecomn services and be-
longs to the diversified Grupo Carso that also includes the Sanborns de-
partment store chain in several countries, along with CompUSA in the
United States. The company, which belongs to Carlos Slim who also
owns Telmex, has been long shielded from competition in the domestic
market and took advantage of this situation to invest internationally. In
fact, Telmex and Telef6nica, its larger Spanish rival, have basically a du-
opoly across Latin America and as of September 2009 they were the sixth
and the fifth largest operators worldwide in terms of accesses (after three
Chinese companies and Vodafone).90 Interestingly, their dominancy in
Central America is being challenged by Millicom, which has established
itself as the clear leader in the three largest markets (Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, and El Salvador).
87. Id.
88. Con la Liegada de Inversiones al Pas, se Consolida la Avanzada Mexicana, LA
NAcION, Sept. 23, 2007.
89. Donald R. Lessard & Rafael Lucca, Mexican Multinationals: Insights from
CEMEX, at 3, available at http://gemseminar.scripts.mit.edu/docs/santos2.pdf.
90. See Table 12.
2010] A LOOK AT RECENT TRENDS 693
TABLE 12. AMI RICA MOVIL AND TELEFONICA MOVILES
OPERATIONS IN 2005 AND 2008/09
[MARKET SHARE IN PERCENTAGE]9'
Amdrica M6vil Telef6nica M6viles AMX+TMX
2005 2009 2005 2008 2005 2008109
South America
Argentina 31 32 38 34 69 66
Brazil'92  22 26 34 30 56 56
Chile 17 19 47 43 64 62
Colombia 63 62 27 25 90 97
Ecuador 65 71 31 27 96 98
Paraguay 10 32 0 0 10 32
Peru 35 40 60 63 95 103
Uruguay 14 32 36 n.a. 50 n.a.
Venezuela 0 0 44 38 44 38
Central America
El Salvador 37 32 23 n.a. 60 na.
Guatemala 47 32 25 na. 72 n.a.
Honduras 34 32 0 0 34 32
Nicaragua 67 32 33 n.a. 100 na.
Panama 0 62 53 n.a. 53 na.
Caribbean
Dominican
Republic 0 42 0 0 0 42
Jamaica 0 42 0 0 0 42
Puerto Rico 0 42 0 0 0 42
Hlome markets
Mexico 77 7214 20 91 9
Spain 0 044 P
Two more strategic approaches can be identified. Bimbo is an example
of a Mexican firm that became the main supplier of a foreign company in
the domestic market, in this case of McDonald's for hamburger buns, and
then globalized to serve this key customer. Similar experiences can also
be found in the auto parts business. Dr. Ahorro and Dr. Simi are two
pharmacy chains that focused on the so-called "bottom of the pyramid"
and specialized in the distribution and sale of generic drugs, first in Mex-
ico and then elsewhere in Latin America. 93
91. Judith Mariscal, Market Structure in the Latin American Mobile Sector (Sept. 2008)
available at h ttp://www.conectarimporta.org/telecom/wp-con ten t/uploads/20l 0/06/
market..structure-penetration.pdf.
92. (a) Telef6nica M6vile't Networks (Brasilcel and Vivo) is jointly owned with
Portugal Telecom.
93. See, e.g., En la Guerra de Farmacias Mexicanas, Dr. Ahorro se Impone a Dr. Simi,
LA NACION, Apr. 23 2007 (on their strategies in Argentina).
694 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
A final typology, the Mexican subsidiary of an international company
that becomes the vehicle for international expansion, is represented by
WALMEX In late 2009 WALMEX signed a final agreement to acquire
Wal-Mart Centroamerica, the leading retailer in the region, operating su-
permarkets, discount stores, and hypermarkets in Guatemala, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. held a
fifty-one percent equity position in Wal-Mart Centroamerica, with the re-
maining forty-nine percent in the hands of minority shareholders in the
region.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As the WTO observed in its 2008 Trade Policy Review, "Mexico consid-
ers foreign investment promotion as a key force for economic develop-
ment and more active participation by the country in the international
economy, as well as a necessary complement to trade liberalization."19 4
Prima facie, the results achieved over the past two decades have been
quite impressive and Mexico has turned proximity to the US, preferential
access to this and other markets and the low cost of labor into convincing
arguments vis- -vis foreign investors.
Over the past few years, however, a number of issues have arisen that
raise concerns. First and foremost is the fact that the large amounts of
FDI that still flow into the country are largely the same quality as ten or
fifteen years ago; while there has been some progress in attracting FDI in
the transport equipment industry, not only in motor vehicles but also in
aerospace, for the rest Mexico remains scarcely visible in the race for
higher-quality FDJ. Globalization has brought in its wake an accelerated
process of internationalization of R&D. Market (demand), availability of
researchers, and technology related factors such as good IPR protection
are most frequently cited as the determining location factors for this par-
ticular FDI typology. Unfortunately, on most such factors Mexico trails
behind competitors in other emerging economies.
Second, more and more countries have entered the competition glob-
ally for FDI, offering labor as cheap as in Mexico, or even lower, but also
better framework conditions such as physical and institutional infrastruc-
ture, personal safety, and good governance. China is obviously the main
factor here because in addition to all such factors it has a much bigger
market that grows much faster than Mexico's and produces cohorts after
cohorts of well-educated workers and managers. Thus, the competitive
position of Mexico in attracting FDI has been eroded because it competes
with basically the same comparative advantages in a much harder com-
petitive environment.
The third cause of concern is that foreign MNCs have produced few
linkages with the domestic economy and this limits the potential to turn
94. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Mexico (Feb. 11,
2008), available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/tratope/tpr e/tp295-e.htm.
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FDI into a catalyst for higher productivity and stronger corporate capa-
bilities. There are various issues here. First, relying heavily on cheap la-
bor and imports for productive inputs, the foreign manufacturing sector
remains largely disconnected from the domestic Mexican economy. Sec-
ond, the sort of low-end assembly activities that MNCs moved to Mexico
may have a low potential for productivity growth. Third, Mexico has not
upgraded its education system (which suffers from serious quality
problems, as indicated by poor PISA scores) to match its FDI-led devel-
opment goals, limiting its absorptive capacity for knowledge spillovers.
Governance is a fourth sour point. On the one hand, despite the pres-
ence of foreign companies and the race to attract FDI, environmental and
governance improvements did not materialize. On the other hand, preex-
isting problems in domestic governance persist and may have even wors-
ened in recent years, in particular crime and the rule of law, thus acting as
a deterrent to FDJ. Another concern is the impossibility of separating
the impact of FDI from other factors such as the growing polarization
between regions, the industrialized North, and the underdeveloped
South. At a minimum, regional disparities in human and infrastructure
capital appear to determine both the geographical distribution of FDI
inflows and the persistence of socio-economic differences.
A bright spot in this landscape is the growing visibility of Mexican
MNCs in global markets, and particularly within regional markets. This
phenomenon is one of the distinguishing features of the current redraw-
ing of the geography of world business, and in fact, caution must be ob-
served before drawing excessively optimistic generalizations from the
successes of Cemex, Bimbo and a handful of other companies (especially
as some of them enjoy strong dominance in the domestic market). None-
theless, that Mexican firms have become leading investors across a range
of sectors, establishing a significant and highly diversified footprint in the
Americas, testifies to the relevant potential of Mexico's business.
Authorities are aware of these problems and actions are being
launched. "A number of policy initiatives have been developed to accel-
erate the transition toward an innovation-fuelled growth path."95 Other
reforms to "promote competition and transparency in the financial sec-
tor" and, to a lesser extent in telecommunications, will stimulate the dy-
namism of the economy. Still other actions have been taken to increase
enrolment in lower secondary education and improve the quality of
teaching.96 The one-stop shop tuempresa.gob.mx was introduced to sim-
plify administrative procedures to start-up a business in Mexico and to
facilitate better interaction between individuals and the government.
95. OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Mex., OECD, Oct. 2009, http://www.oecd.
org/dociiment270,3343,en_2649_34273_43822619-_1-11_1,O0&&en-USS OI DBC.
html.
96. Cyrille Schwellnus, Achieving Higher Performance: Enhancing Spending Effi-
ciency in Health & Educ. in Mexico (OECD Working Paper No. 732, 2009).
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No matter how welcome and necessary, so far all such measures have
had a rather limited impact. It is important to maintain the reformist
momentum In areas such as competition, especially in network industries,
the foreign investment and trade regimes, health and education coverage
and trade-related infrastructure. In addition, it is time to rethink the role
of industrial policy in supporting the creation of competitive linkages be-
tween local suppliers, foreign firms, and global production chains.
